A recently reported phenomenon, termed attribute amnesia, challenged the commonly held belief that attention plays the determining role in controlling how information is remembered, by showing that participants fail to remember a specific attended attribute (e.g., the target-defining color), even when they had just used that attribute to perform a task (H. Chen & Wyble, 2015a) . The main purpose of the present study sought to better understand the mechanism underlying this phenomenon. The results revealed that attribute amnesia was nearly eliminated once participants were forced to store and hold attended information for a brief time, suggesting that this amnesia effect most likely reflects a lack of memory consolidation for an attended attribute that had been processed to some certain level. In addition, we demonstrated that the effect is not particular to the use of location report or the repetition of targets. One additional finding is that amnesia was markedly absent for location memory, indicating an important difference between memories for locations and attributes such as color or identity.
It is generally assumed by both scientists and layfolk that clearly visible information that is the focus of attention will be remembered a few seconds later. However, H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) recently challenged this assumption by showing evidence that participants fail to remember an attended attribute (e.g., color or identity) of a target stimulus, even though they had just used that same attribute to locate the target among distractors moments before. This occurs even without intervening information such as distractors or questions and despite the use of a simple fouralternative recognition test. Such a counterintuitive effect was termed attribute amnesia (AA).
The AA effect has been replicated in a number of different contexts. In the first experiment of H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) , participants were repeatedly asked to report the location of a target letter among three distractor numbers, and were then unexpectedly asked to report the identity of the target letter before reporting its location in a surprise trial. The results showed that participants were incapable of reporting the target identity, which was the key attribute (i.e., target-defining attribute) that they had just used to find the target. Other recent studies have also explored the use of surprise questions to probe memory and have found that attributes that are irrelevant to the task can also be difficult to remember (Eitam, Yeshurun, & Hassan, 2013) . In contrast, the AA effect described by H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) involves amnesia for an attribute that is task relevant, because participants need to use that stimulus attribute to perform the task for the entire series of trials.
This effect was then replicated using an increased stimulus duration (from 150 to 250 ms) and without the stimulus masks. In another replication, AA held when participants were required to report the location of an odd number among three even numbers, or vice versa, wherein they had to extract the meaning (i.e., identity) of the numbers as suggested by previous studies (e.g., Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & d'Ydewalle, 1996; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999) . This replication using number parity as the key attribute provided stronger evidence that AA occurs even when the attended attribute had been identified. Moreover, this effect was extended to a case in which the unreportable key attribute was a pop-out color (i.e., participants were asked to report the location of a colored letter among three black letters, and were then surprisingly asked to report the color of the target letter). Finally, the AA effect was shown to occur with only 11 presurprise trials in the last experiment of H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) , and thus does not require a prolonged series of trials before the surprise trial.
Note that the observed AA is a phenomenon that neither arises from the limitation of perception nor from limited working memory capacity. Participants in H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) were always asked to selectively attend to only one object (i.e., target) and report its location during the task, and the high performance of the target location report indeed showed that participants could effectively and accurately deploy their attention to the target. More importantly, the results of control trials (following the surprise trial) proved that participants could correctly report those attributes that had previously been unreportable, once they expected to report them. However, the mechanism underlying AA remains unknown and the main purpose of the present study was to address this issue. In this effort, we draw a distinction between encoding and consolidation, as described by Jolicoeur and Dell'Acqua (1998) . In the case of AA, despite the failure to report target-defining attributes (e.g., color and identity), participants had clearly encoded these attributes to some certain level because they could use them to perform a task (e.g., determining whether a number was odd or even). Thus, we hypothesize that AA reflects a failure to consolidate short-lived encoded information into a durable form of memory. By consolidate, we mean storing and holding information in a form of memory that is sufficient to survive an interruption such as delay or masking, allowing that information to be used to perform a subsequent task. A critical test of this hypothesis is to force participants to consolidate a piece of information into memory in order to perform a selection task and to see whether such a manipulation itself can eliminate AA. The results of this experiment will be compared with a parallel experiment in which AA will be assessed for information that is used in the task but does not need to be consolidated.
However, before evaluating this hypothesis, we attempted to generalize AA to two different cases so as to eliminate two alternative explanations related to particular aspects of the experimental designs in H. Chen and Wyble's (2015a) study.
First, in all five experiments of H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) , participants were asked to localize a target among three distractors and report its location in presurprise trials. Such a location report task might encourage participants to prioritize location information over attributes (e.g., shape, size, identity, and color), which have often been suggested to be processed separately from location information (Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994) . Thus, it might be the case that AA occurs whenever target location is the only reported information. Reporting any one attribute (e.g., shape, size, identity, or color) may force the encoding of other attributes.
Second, note that each experiment in H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) contained only four possible target stimulus values that were repeated across trials (e.g., four letters, four odd or even numbers, or four colors). This raises the possibility 1 that the observed AA might rely on the repeated exposure to a small set of attribute values. More precisely, AA might occur only when the attribute values on the surprise trial were extremely familiar in the context of the task because of repetition, which would make it difficult for participants to distinguish between the target and the other three highly familiar stimulus choices. This possibility would not provide an explanation for the dramatic improvement in performance on the control trials, which is a crucial characteristic of AA, but it would add some additional constraints on the possible mechanisms.
The aforementioned two possibilities will be evaluated in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Then, the absence-of-consolidation hypothesis will be investigated in Experiment 3.
Experiment 1
As just discussed, in this experiment, we aimed to eliminate the possibility that AA results from the reliance on the requirement of location report. It may be that if the task involves reporting an attribute, then amnesia for another attended attribute of the same stimulus would not be observed. To answer this question, we tested whether AA would be eliminated by asking participants to report an attribute of a stimulus instead of its location. Specifically, we asked participants to select a target based on its identity and to report its color in a series of presurprise trials, and then surprisingly asked them to report the identity and location of that target letter in the surprise trial. If AA is only observed when target location is reported, then we should not observe it in this case.
Method
Participants. Twenty Pennsylvania State University undergraduates completed this experiment in exchange for course credits. All of them reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. No participants were excluded from any of the experiments, nor were any participants replaced.
Apparatus. The experiment closely following the setting of H. Chen and Wyble's (2015a) study. The stimuli were presented on a 17-in. CRT monitor (1024 ϫ 768 resolution) by using MATLAB with the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) . The view distance was fixed at 50 cm by using a chinrest. Participants made responses through a computer keyboard.
Stimuli. The fixation display included four black placeholder circles (0.62 degrees of visual angle) and a black central fixation cross (0.62°). The four circles were presented at four corners of an invisible square (6.25°ϫ 6.25°), with the fixation cross in its center. Procedure and design. As shown in Figure 1 , each trial began with the fixation display for a duration that varied between 800 ms and 1800 ms. After that, the stimulus array appeared for 250 ms, which was replaced by the masks for 100 ms. After a 400-ms blank screen following the disappearance of the masks, four different colored lines and four corresponding numbers (1 to 4) appeared and remained on the screen until participants made a response.
Each participant completed 16 trials in this experiment. The first 11 trials proceeded as just described, in which participants were asked to report the color of the target letter by pressing one of four number keys (1 to 4) corresponding to the colored line with the same color as the target letter. In the 12th trial (i.e., the surprise trial), the participants were unexpectedly presented with two forced-choice arrays in succession and asked to report the identity (they saw four different letters in black and were asked to pick the target letter) and the location of the target letter (they saw the numbers 5, 6, 7, and 8 presented at the same locations as the four placeholders and were asked to pick the one that corresponded to the location of the target letter), prior to reporting its color. The four possible choices for each question (i.e., four black letters in identity task or four black numbers in location task) were presented in a random order on each trial. The order of the identity and location report tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 1 We thank Todd Horowitz for suggesting this possibility. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Immediately following the surprise trial, the participants received four more control trials of the same format as the surprise trial.
Results and Discussion
The results of this experiment are depicted in Table 1 . The accuracy of the color report task in presurprise trials was 84%, indicating that participants could easily select the target letter among distractor numbers by using the target defining key attribute (i.e., identity) and report its color with a high accuracy.
The surprise-trial data were separately analyzed from the two groups that were determined by the order of the surprise tasks (identity report first vs. location report first). The result did not differ between these two groups in this and all subsequent experiments. Consequently, we collapsed the data of these two groups for subsequent analyses in this study. As expected, only 8 of 20 (40% correct) participants correctly reported the identity of the target letter in the surprise trial, indicating that the AA effect was replicated in this experiment, even when the task in the presurprise trials required subjects to report an attribute (i.e., color), rather than the location, of the target. Critically, the performance of the identity report in the first control trial (i.e., the trial immediately after the surprise trial) dramatically increased compared with the surprise trial, and this increment was highly significant (80% vs. 40%), 2 (1, N ϭ 40) ϭ 6.667, p ϭ .009, ϭ .41. The accuracy of the identity task was consistently high in the following three control trials: 90%, 90%, and 80% correct. These results demon- 
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strated that participants' expectation plays a vital role in determining the memory of the attended information. Intriguingly, and contrary to the surprise-identity-report task in this and many other demonstrations of AA, participants performed well in the location report task in the surprise trial (75% correct), which was remarkably higher than that of the identity report (location, 75% vs. Identity, 40%), 2 (1, N ϭ 40) ϭ 5.013, p ϭ .025, ϭ .35. Note that participants had no expectation to report the location as well as the identity of the target letter until the surprise test. The performance of the location task was constantly high in control trials (95%, 100%, 95%, and 90%).
Participants exhibited a large decline of the accuracy of reporting the target color in the surprise trial (40% correct) compared with the presurprise (84% correct) and control trials (75%, 85%, 100%, and 80%). This might reflect the fact that the color test question in the surprise trial was presented after the two surprise questions (i.e., identity and location), causing some participants to forget the color while answering the surprise questions.
This experiment extended H. Chen and Wyble's (2015a) study by replicating AA even when using attribute report (i.e., color), instead of the location report task in presurprise trials. This finding eliminates the possibility that AA occurs only when using location as the reported information in the presurprise trials. Also, the result implies that accessing one attribute of an attended stimulus does not guarantee accessing other attributes of the same stimulus. Moreover, the experiment showed that, contrary to the case of attributes, participants could accurately report the location of the target despite the fact that they did not have an expectation to remember it. In other words, amnesia was remarkably attenuated for the location compared with the attributes of the attended target. This result suggests that participants might automatically store the location information of the attended target letter irrespective of the task relevance, which is in line with a recent study showing that participants could correctly report the location but not attributes of an attended visual cue in an unexpected question (H. Chen & Wyble, 2015b) .
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was intended to test the second possibility, which is that AA occurs only when targets are highly familiar because of being repeatedly used as targets. In this experiment, we used a larger set of target stimuli so as to ensure that the target stimulus would never be repeated across trials.
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Another 20 undergraduates participated in this experiment. There were 16 possible target letters (A, B, C, D, F, H, J, K, L, N, P, R, T, V, X, and Y), and each one was randomly assigned to one of 16 trials. There were eight possible distractor numbers (2 to 9), and three of them were randomly chosen for each trial. There was no stimulus mask in this experiment. In the first 11 presurprise trials, participants were asked to report the location of the target letter among three distractor numbers. Then, in the surprise trial, participants were unexpectedly asked to report the identity and color of the target letter before reporting its location. The four possible choices in the surprise identity question were constituted by the target letter as well as three other different letters randomly chosen from the aforementioned set of letters. Finally, as before, four more control trials were given after the surprise trial.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, AA was obtained (see Table 2 ). Participants were poor at both color (35% correct) and identity report (40% correct) in the surprise trial. Both the color and identity report accuracies remained high in the three following control trials (color: 95%, 90%, and 100% correct; identity: 95%, 100%, and 90% correct). In addition, participants achieved high accuracy on the primary location task in presurprise (91% correct), surprise (80% correct), and control trials (70%, 85%, 90%, and 85% correct).
This experiment replicated the AA effect despite eliminating target repetitions, and therefore demonstrated that AA is not reliant on familiarity of the target stimuli. In addition, the stimulus array was not masked in this experiment, which replicates the finding of H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) that masking the stimuli is unnecessary for obtaining an AA. Moreover, participants performed well in reporting the location in the surprise trial as well as in the control trials, even when it had also been queried after the two surprise questions.
Experiment 3a
The previous experiments addressed two ways in which our observations of AA might have relied on the particular method in H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) . Namely, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the AA neither results from privileged memory for location over attributes because of the location report task, nor does it depend on the difficulty of discriminating between highly familiar stimuli when targets are repeated across trials. 
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The present experiment aimed to test our hypothesis that AA might reflect a failure to consolidate attended information into memory. We addressed this issue by forcing participants to consolidate the key attribute for selecting a target by masking it prior to the stimulus display, but without having an expectation to explicitly report that information. We then provided a similar surprise question as in the previous experiments to test the memory of the key attribute. If the absence of consolidation hypothesis is true, then the AA should be largely attenuated or eliminated using this manipulation. Otherwise, a similar level of AA effect should be observed even using this method.
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except as follows. Twenty new undergraduate participants completed this experiment. As depicted in Figure 2 , at the beginning of each trial, participants were presented a colored (red, blue, yellow, or magenta, with the same RGB values as in Experiment 1) central fixation cross (1.03°) with four black placeholder circles for 200 ms. The colored fixation cross was then replaced by a 100-ms mask consisting of different colored lines. After the offset of the fixation mask and placeholder circles, four different colored letters (A, B, D, and E, each randomly assigned with one of the aforementioned four colors) appeared at the same locations as the four placeholder circles for 400 ms. One of these four letters was the target, which was displayed in the same color as the fixation cross that had just been presented at the beginning of that trial. The other three colored letters were distractors. All four letters were then masked for 500 ms. On presurprise trials, participants were given four numbers (1-4) at the same location as the placeholders. Whereas on the surprise trial, before the presentation of this location probe question, four colored lines and their corresponding numbers were displayed on the screen until participants made a response.
Participants completed 27 presurprise trials wherein they were asked only to report the location of the target letter sharing the same color as the fixation cross at the start of that trial. Then, in the surprise trial, they were unexpectedly asked to report the color of the target letter at that trial before reporting its location. After the surprise trial, participants received four more control trials as usual.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Table 3 , contrary to previous experiments, the AA was nearly absent, with 16 of 20 (80% correct) participants correctly reporting the color in the surprise trial. This performance is largely and significantly better than those in previous experiments, which were no better than 40% correct (80% vs. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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also consistently high in the four subsequent control trials (95%, 95%, 90%, and 90% correct). Participants' accuracy of reporting the location dropped in the surprise trial (60% correct) compared with the presurprise (90% correct) and control trials (85%, 90%, 90%, and 90% correct). Experiment 3a provided the first evidence of substantially attenuating the robust AA effect by forcing participants to consolidate the key attribute into memory, but without requiring them to report it prior to the surprise trial. This finding suggests that the observed AA in Experiments 1 and 2 as well as H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) reflects a deficit of memory consolidation for attended and identified key attributes into memory.
Experiment 3b
It is worth mentioning that in the surprise trial of Experiment 3a, the target color that observers needed to report was presented in both fixation and stimulus displays, whereas the other three distractor colors were only shown in the stimulus display.
2 Thus, it might be argued that the attenuation of AA (i.e., observers accurately reported the color of the target letter in the surprise trial even though they did not expect to report it) in Experiment 3a reflects the use of familiarity to choose a response. This experiment was conducted to replicate Experiment 3a and also to rule out this possibility by presenting all four possible colors in both fixation and stimulus displays.
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3a, with the following changes. Sixteen new undergraduate participants participated in this experiment. The fixation cross was composed of four different colored lines (red, blue, yellow, or magenta, the same RGB values as in Experiment 3a; see Figure 2 ), with one of them being longer than the others (long line, 2.31°in length; short lines, 1.54°in length). The colors were in different positions on every trial, and also a different spoke of the fixation was randomly selected on every trial. To ensure observers have enough time to clearly see all four colors, the fixation exposure duration was increased to 800 ms, which was then followed by a 500-ms colored mask. Observers were asked to report the location of the target letter that has the same color as the longer spoke in the fixation cross at the beginning of that trial, and then were unexpectedly asked the color of the target letter in the surprise trial.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Table 4 , the results of this experiment essentially replicated Experiment 3a. Thirteen of sixteen (81% correct) observers correctly report the color of the target letter in the surprise trial, indicating that the attenuation of AA in Experiment 3a was not caused by the aforementioned confound of stimulus repetition within the trial. Instead, such an attenuation arises from the fact that the tasks in Experiments 3a and 3b require observers to store and hold key attribute in memory to perform a delay task. In addition, observers' accuracy of color report in the following control trials was also very high (100%, 100%, 100%, and 94% correct). Moreover, as in Experiment 3, their performance of location report was slightly worse in the surprise trial (81% correct) compared with the presurprise (97% correct) and control (94%, 94%, 100%, and 94% correct) trials.
Experiment 3c
Finally, to test the absence-of-consolidation hypothesis, we wanted to replicate Experiment 3a with one change, which is that now participants could complete the color search task without storing the color of the fixation cross in memory. To be specific, we replicated Experiment 3a except that we displayed the colored fixation cross simultaneously with the target and distractors. Our prediction was that, unlike the Experiments 3a and 3b, the AA effect for the targetdefining color should be observed here because there was no requirement to store the color of the fixation cross into memory.
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3a, with the following changes. Twenty participants recruited from the Pennsylvania State University participated in exchange for $5. The trial began with the fixation display containing a black fixation cross and four black placeholder circles for 300 ms, which was followed by the stimulus display. The stimulus display included four different colored letters appearing at four corners of an invisible square, with one colored central fixation cross at its center. The letter with the same color as the fixation cross was the target letter, whereas the remaining three letters were distractors. After 400 ms, all four letters and the central fixation cross were masked for 500 ms. Participants were asked to report the location of the target letter on the presurprise trials, and then they were surprisingly asked to report the color of the target letter.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, the AA effect was clearly shown in this experiment, with only nine of 20 participants (45% correct) correctly reporting the color of the target (see Table 5 ). This performance is 2 We thank Garrett Swan for alerting us to this potential confound. (1, N ϭ 40) ϭ 5.227, p ϭ .022, ϭ .36. Critically, participants' performance of color report highly significantly increased on the first control trial (90% vs. 45%), 2 (1, N ϭ 40) ϭ 9.231, p ϭ .002, ϭ .48, and remained consistent high on the following three control trials (90%, 100%, and 100% correct). Participants' performance of location report on the surprise trial (65% correct) was worse than the presurprise trials (93% correct) and control trials (80%, 90%, 100%, and 100% correct).
These results demonstrated that the AA effect could be obtained even when participants were asked to use a particular color to search for the target. Note that this experiment is identical to Experiment 3a, except that the search color was displayed simultaneously with the stimulus display. Thus, the elimination of AA in Experiments 3a and 3b should not be related to the fact that participants used the key attribute as a search template to find the target. Instead, the release of AA in these two experiments more likely reflects the requirement that participants have to store the target-defining color from the fixation display in order to perform the task in the subsequent displays.
This experiment also provides even stronger evidence that participants had identified the attribute that they were subsequently unable to report. In H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) , it could be argued that participants located the target because of its difference from distractors without actually having identified the key attribute. Note that H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) argued against this possibility by demonstrating that AA can be observed even when participants were asked to select an odd number among evens, or vice versa, which should have required identification (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1993; Fias et al., 1996; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999) . The results of Experiment 3c are even clearer in this respect, as participants had to determine the color of the fixation cross in order to find the target letter with the same color.
General Discussion
With five experiments, the present study sought to understand the mechanisms underlying AA, a counterintuitive effect in which participants fail to report attended information just after it was shown (H. Chen & Wyble, 2015a) , as well as to generalize this effect to different circumstances so as to eliminate alternative explanations. Experiment 1 showed that AA was still obtained even when the participants were engaged in a task requiring them to report another attribute (i.e., color) of the target that was not the target-defining attribute (i.e., identity) queried in the surprise question. This finding dismissed the possibility that the previously observed AA results are specific to using a location report task in the presurprise trials. Experiment 2 replicated AA again, even after increasing the number of possible target stimuli so as to ensure that the target stimulus would never be the same at any two different trials in the whole experiment. This finding ruled out another plausible explanation, which is that AA occurs when stimuli are highly familiar because of repetitions within the experiment, such that it is difficult to discriminate between memories of the target letter and the other three highly familiar letters in the surprise forced choice test. Experiment 3a revealed that the robust AA effect was largely attenuated after forcing participants to store and hold the key attribute in memory even for a very brief time. This result was replicated even after eliminating the confound of stimulus exposure difference in Experiment 3b. More importantly, Experiment 3c showed a clear AA effect even when asking participants to use a particular color to search for a target (with the same color) as in Experiment 3a, but without requiring them to hold that color in memory. Because Experiments 3a and 3c used essentially the same task, but differed only in the requirement to hold the target-determining color in mind, the results support the hypothesis that an absence of consolidation is responsible for AA. That is, in Experiment 3c, participants attended to the color of the fixation cross and used it to find the target, but without storing that information as a memory trace that was sufficient to be reported in the surprise task. In contrast, Experiment 3a forced participants to store the fixation color in memory for a fraction of a second in order to find the target, and this consolidation allowed most of them to remember the information in the surprise trial.
Failure to Report: Blindness (Failure of Perception) Versus Amnesia (Failure of Memory)
Perhaps the most counterintuitive phenomenon of visual awareness is inattentional blindness, in which participants often fail to report a highly salient stimulus (e.g., a gorilla) in front of their eye if their attention was engaged elsewhere (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Simons & Chabris, 1999) . As shown in Figure 3 , one controversy concerning the mechanism underlying this phenomenon is whether the inability to report reflects a failure of conscious perception (i.e., blindness; Mack & Rock, 1998; Ward & Scholl, 2014) , or can instead reflect a failure of memory (i.e., amnesia; Moore, 2001; Moore & Egeth, 1997; Wolfe, 1999) . The present findings, together with those in H. Chen and Wyble (2015a) , provided direct evidence of amnesia, showing that participants were incapable of reporting an attended key attribute, even when they had just used This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
it to find the target. These findings imply that at least some instances of inattention blindness might reflect a failure of memory, rather than necessarily involving a failure of perception.
Failure of Memory: Absence of Consolidation Versus Forgetting
Moreover, the present study has further demonstrated that the failure of memory that triggers AA was most likely caused by participants' lack of consolidating identified information into memory, rather than from forgetting the consolidated information while processing the surprise question (see Figure 3) . The supporting evidence comes from Experiments 3a and 3b, showing that AA was dramatically attenuated or eliminated when participants were forced to store and hold the key attribute in order to select the target later, and were then given a similar unexpected question about that attribute. We reasoned that if the surprise question was sufficient to cause the consolidated information to be forgotten in Experiments 1, 2, and 3c, the same would occur in Experiments 3a and 3b. Note that in Experiments 3a and 3b, participants had no expectation that they would have to report the color of the fixation cross prior to the surprise trial. They only had to use it to select the target, and then were free to forget it as far as the instructions and task requirements were concerned. However, the requirement to store that information for just a few hundred milliseconds was sufficient to allow them to report it in response to an unexpected probe during the surprise trial. Thus, our conclusion is that in Experiments 1, 2, and 3c, the information had never been consolidated at all; otherwise it would have been remembered also.
Memory of Location Versus Memory of Attributes
Another intriguing finding from these experiments is that participants could report the location in a surprise trial in Experiment 1. In this respect, the memory for the location of a target seems unlike the memory for its attributes, in that selecting a target seems to ensure that participants will be able to report the target's location, even in an unexpected question.
Locating ("where") and recognizing ("what") an object have often been regarded as two separate processes (e.g., Mishkin et al., 1983; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994) , but such theories are not explicit about differences in memory. The object-file theory initially proposed the special role of location by suggesting that an object file is established based on the location, with object attributes to be added later (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) . Likewise, many other theories also place special emphasis on location during object binding compared with the other object properties (e.g., Cave, 1999; Golomb, Kupitz, & Thiemann, 2014; Huang & Pashler, 2007; Wolfe, 1994) . Moreover, some studies suggest that location, which is fundamental to an object representation, is automatically stored, even when it is task-irrelevant (e.g., Cave & Pashler, 1995; Z. Chen, 2005; Tsal & Lavie, 1988 ). Yet most of these studies relied on indirect evidence by showing the influence of the taskirrelevant location on the processes of other task-relevant object properties. Experiment 1 showed more direct evidence that memory for the location of a target may be compulsory, unlike memory for other attributes of a visual target. The results of H. Chen and Wyble (2015b) also suggested that location information is automatically encoded, even when the participant does not expect to report that information. In that case, the memory was for visual cues, rather than for visual targets, and thus the results of Experiments 1 provide a more direct demonstration that selecting a visual target produces compulsory memory storage for its location, but not memory for its other attributes.
Identification Without Consolidation
Another important finding of this study is that it is possible to perceptually encode information about a stimulus attribute, and then use that information to trigger attentional selection of that stimulus without consolidating it into memory. This conclusion is actually similar to the implications of studies of target selection in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) when target selection involves complex stimuli such as characters or pictures (Potter, 1976; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Wyble, Folk, & Potter, 2013) . For example, in Potter (1976) , individuals had to scan through a series of images and either try to remember all of them in a follow-up recognition study, or to search the RSVP for a specific image category as specified by name. At presentation rates of 133 ms per image, participants had extremely poor memory in the recognition experiment, but were still quite able to detect the target. This implies that participants could not consolidate all of the images into memory in the first task, but were able to identify each image in the second task without committing consolidation of each image to memory. Becker and Pashler (2002) also showed that participants could report the highest digit in a display without being able to detect subsequent changes in the display, despite the fact that they had just used those digits in the comparison process.
The present results extend these classic findings in two ways. First, we show that even perceptual identification of one attribute of a single selected target is insufficient to guarantee consolidation of that attribute, such that people cannot report that information just a few seconds later. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4 , Experiment 3a demonstrates that a requirement to hold onto a perceptually coded attribute for just a few hundred milliseconds is sufficient to cause that attribute Comparison 300 ms 400 ms Figure 4 . The comparison between Experiments 3a and 3c. In Experiment 3a, participants were required to store and hold the fixation color for several hundred milliseconds before using it to search for the target that has the same color. In Experiment 3c, participants only need to use the fixation color to look for the target letter with the same color but without necessarily consolidating that color into memory. Exp. ϭ Experiment. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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to be consolidated into memory with sufficient strength to be retrievable in an unexpected question. In contrast, Experiment 3c reveals that without this brief storage, participants could not even remember the color that they had used to find the target.
How Is an Attended Object Represented in Memory?
The present findings have crucial implications for our understanding of how an attended object is represented in memory, which is a highly debated issue in cognitive psychology. Some studies suggest that people obligatorily store all features of a selected object irrespective of task relevance (e.g., Gao, Gao, Li, Sun, & Shen, 2011; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Marshall & Bays, 2013; Xu, 2010) , whereas this object-based encoding theory was challenged by other research which argued that people can voluntarily encode only task-relevant features and filter out remaining irrelevant features of an attended object (e.g., Serences, Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2009; Woodman & Vogel, 2008) or independently encode different features of the same object (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011) . The current study provided stronger evidence showing that participants often even failed to report task-relevant features of an attended object if they had no expectation to remember them.
One possible way to reconcile these controversial findings is to assume that different features of a selected object are represented in different ways, as suggested by some memory models (e.g., Cowan, 1995; Nee & Jonides, 2013; Oberauer, 2002) . In terms of these models, it could be that the information that is expected to be useful afterward is consolidated into memory, thus allowing participants to report this specific information in response to an unexpected question, whereas the information that can be used without storing it into memory is merely activated in long-term memory (LTM). These activated LTM traces could yield familiarity signals (Oberauer, 2002) , which are sufficient to produce interference on participants' behavioral performance and neurophysiological responses as shown by studies supporting objectbased encoding hypothesis (e.g., Gao et al., 2011; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Marshall & Bays, 2013; Xu, 2010) , but not strong enough to be retrievable in an unexpected question.
Conclusion
The summary of these findings is that a perceptually encoded attribute can be used in service of another decision (i.e., to select a target) without requiring memory consolidation of that attribute, but only if the decision can be made immediately. The slightest delay in using that attribute for another task requires it to be consolidated into memory such that it will be most likely reportable later, even in response to an unexpected question. In addition, this conclusion does not apply to memory for location, which seems to be consolidated in a reportable format regardless of the requirements of a task. These results suggest that the attribute amnesia phenomenon likely reflects a failure of memory consolidation.
